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Social Class and Political Behavior During a Period 
of Economic Stagnation: Apathy and Radicalism in 
the Netherlands, 1985
Leo B. Van Snippenburg and Peer Scheepers1
Increased  apathy ( i .e .,  retreat fro m  p o litic s), instead o f  m assive politica l protest  
am ong the classes that were hit m ost severely by the recent econom ic stagnation  
an d  ensuing retrenchm ent p o lic ie s , is a neglected  phenom enon  in Dutch social 
research. In this article we theorize on this phenom enon . We fo rm u la te  a m odel  
to explain  po litica l apathy am ong lower-class people  in the N etherlands during  
the m id-80s. We also speculate  on and  fo rm u la te  an explanatory m odel on the 
m otives o f  those w h o , during this p e r io d , were still inclined tow ard  politica l  
behavior, notably  tow ard  radical po litica l activities. The m odels are tested with 
data ga thered  in the N etherlands in 1985. The results o f  the analyses indicate  
that being a m em ber o f  a deprived  class increases the likelihood o f  being m ore  
anom ic. In turn, anom ie brings about po litica l apathy. On the other h a n d , 
education decreases po litica l apathy. The analyses fu r th e r  suggest that persons  
who give priority  to so -ca lled  postm ateria lis tic  values are m ore prone  to radical 
po litica l behavior than others. This effect appears to be stronger to the extent 
that they have less confidence in policies.
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INTRODUCTION
Time and again during the mid-80s leftist politicians and journalists pre­
dicted that the harsh retrenchment policies of the Dutch government, and the 
increasing inequality in income at that time, would eventually lead to a social 
revolt of the groups that had been struck most severely: the un- and semiskilled
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workers. Despite these forecasts, a massive social protest failed to appear. On the 
contrary, the “ have-little’' classes instead turned away from politics (Engbersen 
and Van der Veen, 1987; Scheepers, 1986a, 1986b) and lapsed into apathy. How­
ever, some scattered signs of radical political activity continued throughout the 
80s, indicating dissatisfaction with the policy of the center right coalition that 
had governed the Netherlands almost continually since 1977. But these radical 
activities involved citizens who were far from being of specific lower-class 
origin.
In this article, we will first discuss some models formulated to explain the 
lack of political activity among the lower-income groups under these conditions 
of (relative) deprivation. We will integrate these models into a more complex 
model that addresses particularly intrapsychic processes as relevant for the expla­
nation of political apathy (i.e., retreat from regular political activities). A review 
of literature indicated that this is a neglected theme in social research in the 
Netherlands. Subsequently, we will also pay attention to the attitudes and 
motives of those who, despite the politically apathetic spirit during the 80s, were 
still prone to engage in political behavior, notably in radical activities.
POLITICAL APATHY
Those who predicted massive social protest as a consequence of the widen­
ing gap between higher- and lower-income groups (in the Netherlands since
1982, see De Kam and Pommer, 1987), at least implicitly referred to the thesis of 
“ Verelendung" that originated from Marx's work (Marx and Engels, 1985/ 
1848). This thesis states that under (relatively) deteriorating socioeconomic con­
ditions, the have-nots will turn to social protest and revolt. This thesis was later 
severely criticized. Critics emphasized that history has shown that revolt seldom 
emerges under circumstances of relative or absolute social deprivation. Instead, a 
form of collective apathy often manifests itself within deprived groups (Jahoda et 
a l . , 1960/1933). This simple so-called materialistic model is represented in the 
upper part of Fig. 1.
Serious doubts regarding the Verelendungs-thesis were formulated in stud­
ies of social scientists of the so-called “ Frankfurter Schule.’' These doubts actu­
ally stimulated their research on the backgrounds of the authoritarian personality 
(Fromm, 1936, 1983/1929; Adorno et al., 1982/1950). They observed that dur­
ing the economic depression of the late 20s and early 30s, the workers and have- 
nots in Germany did not revolt. They rather remained outside the political sce­
nery. Parts of the middle class, on the other hand, actively engaged in politics, as 
did the cultural and economic elites (Kater, 1983). In light of these facts, the 
Frankfurt School criticized the Marxian notion concerning the direct effects of 
Verelendung on political radicalism. They introduced an auxiliary hypothesis by
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putting the personality as an intermediate variable between the social being and 
social consciousness, between class and ideology (Marx 1977/1859). In their 
view, belonging to a deprived group does not lead to active political behavior. It 
rather promotes the development of an authoritarian personality. Such a person­
ality remains in awe of, and subordinate to, those in authority. It conforms rigidly 
to conventional norms, and has an aggressive attitude toward trespassers of these 
norms. A further characteristic is a cynical outlook on human affairs (Adorno et 
a l . , 1982/1950; Bonss, 1983; Fromm, 1983/1929). Such a personality is not 
expected to stand up to authorities. Instead, it submits itself to authorities and 
remains aloof from the political field (Von Freyhold, 1971). A model that can be 
derived from this Frankfurt thesis is represented in the middle part of Fig. 1.
Taking into account the historical situation at the time of the formulation of 
the authoritarianism thesis, we can hypothesize that this thesis may also hold for
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the recent period of economic stagnation. The circumstances were similar in 
several respects: as during the 30s, the lower classes again had to bear an uneven 
share of the burden of the recession, and had to face the harshest consequences of 
retrenchment policies.
Felling et al. (1986), in their view on social reality of the 80s, add some 
elements to the authoritarianism thesis. They acknowledge that modem societies 
are “ achieving societies” in which achievement motivation and related tradi­
tional bourgeois values have high priority. People derive prestige and self-esteem 
from the realization of these values. But the chances of successfully realizing 
these value are unequally distributed in society, and if people do not succeed in 
raising their position on the societal ladder, feelings of status-anxiety and so­
cioeconomic frustration arise. These feelings, which are assumed to be inversely 
associated with social class, are followed by two kinds of psychic reactions. 
First, they bring about a repression of spontaneous impulses, which subsequently 
may lead to authoritarianism (this notion is derived from Fromm, 1936). Second, 
they generate dissonance-reduction processes (this notion is derived from Fes- 
tinger, 1957). Dissonance-reduction processes are psychical anticipations to the 
(threatening) discrepancy between aspirations and actual achievements. As a 
consequence, a mental state of anomie is likely to arise. Its characteristics are 
feelings of powerlessness, meaninglessness and social isolation. Authoritarian­
ism and anomie refer to social resignation, and a lack of willingness to stand up 
against authorities, that may eventually lead to political apathy. Summarizing, 
Felling et al. propose a model in which subjective experiences (status-anxiety 
and socioeconomic frustration) that are associated with one’s objective class 
position bring about a state of mind, characterized by authoritarianism and 
anomie, that is responsible for abstention from political activities. Felling et al. 
thus deny a direct effect of class on authoritarianism and anomie. They state that 
it is socioeconomic frustration and status-anxiety that mediate the relation be­
tween social class and authoritarianism and anomie. It is in this respect that their 
model differs from the aforementioned model of the Frankfurt School.
These theoretical notions all contain factors that are assumed to increase the 
level of political apathy. A decrease in political apathy may be derived from 
another perspective, offered by Gabennesch (1972). He theorized that education 
provides people with an awareness of cultural diversity and a breadth of perspec­
tive. This might decrease authoritarianism and anomie. Furthermore, education 
is specifically expected to have a negative effect on political apathy because 
people who have attained higher educational levels are cognitively more familiar 
with means and possibilities to influence political affairs.
Taking as points of departure the described models, that is, the successively 
formulated materialistic model derived from the critics of the Verelendungs- 
thesis, the authoritarianism model of the Frankfurters, and the elaborations on it 
of Felling et al. and Gabennesch, we can design an integrated model to explain
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political apathy in the Netherlands during the 80s. This integrated model is 
represented in the bottom part of Fig. 1. In our Data Analysis, we will describe 
efforts to test this integrated model empirically. But first we will try to formulate 
a theoretical answer to the question of what the motives were of those who, in the- 
80s, were still prone to engage in social protest and radical political behavior.
RADICAL POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
As we stated above, socioeconomic deprivation, as experienced by the 
lowest classes during the recent economic stagnation, did not lead to protest. 
Nevertheless, there were some outbursts of radical political activity in the 80s. 
But this did not occur among the lower classes. The following question arises: 
What were the motives of those who, during the socioeconomic malaise, acted in 
a radical way? Here the “ theory of rising expectations” may offer some clues. In 
its original formulation this theory was stated by De Tocqueville, and was later 
elaborated by, among others, Brinton and Davies (see Wertheim, 1971). It is, in a 
sense, an inversion of the Verelendungs-thesis (Thurlings, 1977). According to 
the theory of rising expectations, it is not deprivation, but the obstruction of 
favorable prospects and rising expectations that encourage social protest and 
radical political behavior. People experiencing such frustrations become morally 
indignant, sometimes socially envious, and they easily turn to political protest 
and radicalism as a consequence. Bell (1973) calls this phenomenon the “Toc- 
queville effect.” Van Snippenburg (1987) elaborates on this theme in his concep­
tualization of conditions that in the 60s led to the rise of massive protests among 
young adults and feminists in the Western European countries. Youngsters as 
well as women of that time experienced discrepancies between their greatly 
increased expectations and the harsh reality regarding occupational chances and 
possibilities for participating in political decision-making.
Although few people harbored great expectations during the first half of the 
80s, especially regarding the socioeconomic sphere, there were some who did 
not become pessimistic and remained even optimistic with respect to some non­
material issues. At the beginning of this decade there seemed to be no reason to 
fear, for example, a stagnation in the steady progress towards a more democratic 
political culture, towards environmental care and towards more permissive at­
titudes. Some people continued to consider these issues as most important. They 
were especially to be found among well-educated and relatively young people 
(Inglehart, 1977; Thomassen et cil., 1983; Van Deth, 1984). Despite the eco­
nomic malaise, these groups retained relatively good career prospects; hence 
they did not have to worry too much about economic and physical needs. They 
gave more priority to so-called postmaterialistic goals like free speech, political 
participation, and a less impersonal society.
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Fig. 2. Model to explain political radicalism.
Although economic stagnation in itself need not be inhibitory for fulfillment 
of postmaterialistic goals, it soon became clear that this fulfillment was gradually 
slowed down or postponed. Politicians and various authorities had other worries. 
Retrenchment, and sometimes even restoration took over, and technocracy be­
came the new political strategy. As the 80s wore on, postmaterialists were bound 
to become frustrated regarding the progress of the issues they considered impor­
tant. We may suppose that their background [well-educated, middle-class origin, 
favorable prospects; see, among others, Thomassen et al. (1983) and Elsinga 
(1985) with regard to the situation in the Netherlands) prevented a lot of them 
from turning to political apathy too readily. They remained politically active. But 
it is not likely that they restricted themselves to conventional political means like 
voting, attending meetings of political parties, and discussing politics with 
friends (Elsinga, 1985; Inglehart, 1977). They gradually became more disap­
pointed with the political decision-makers. They may rather have engaged in 
radical activities as well, like unofficial strikes, obstruction of roads, occupation 
of buildings. Hence, we hypothesize that postmaterialists in the 80s were still 
inclined to radical political activity. We expect this inclination to have been 
greater among those who had less confidence in politics, notably in established 
political practices and structures. This in fact leads to the following so-called 
interactive hypothesis: People who gave more priority to postmaterialistic values 
were more inclined to engage in radical political behavior during the recent 
economic stagnation, especially when they had little confidence in conventional 
politics. The path-diagram in Fig. 2 is a formal representation of this hypothesis. 
In our Data Analysis we will test this hypothesis, but we will first give a descrip­
tion of the operationalizations of concepts we mentioned in this and in the 
previous section.
DATA AND METHODS
Sample
In 1985, a two-stage random sample of Dutch citizens (N =  1799) was 
drawn. First, the Netherlands was divided into four regional zones: North, East,
political distrust
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South, and West. Within these zones, municipalities were sampled proportionate 
to national distributions regarding the degree of urbanization. Second, respon­
dents were selected randomly out of these municipalities.
The distributions of sample respondents with respect to sex, age, marital 
status, as well as the combination of these characteristics, appeared to be an 
optimal approximation of known national distributions (Felling et al., 1987, pp. 
9-10). We therefore may consider this sample to be representative of the Dutch 
population.
Measurement Scales
Political apathy was measured using items that refer to abstention from 
political participation. Respondents were asked whether they had voted at the last 
national election, were a member of a political party, were active for a political 
party, had discussed politics, had tried to convince friends to vote for their 
favored party, had cooperated with members of the community to solve local 
problems, had attended political meetings, or had contacted political officials. 
Respondents who never performed these political activities were considered to be 
politically apathetic. We constructed a scale out of these items by means of 
probabilistic scalogramanalysis (Mokken, 1970). Its scalability (H) is 0.49 and 
its reliability (rho) amounts to 0.75. In Appendix 1 we present detailed informa­
tion on the scale. The scale is a slightly modified reversion of the one-dimension- 
al scale introduced by Barnes et al. (1979) to measure participation in conven­
tional political activities. The Barnes et al. scale was used in the Netherlands by 
Thomassen et al. (1983) and Elsinga (1985). Instead of taking account of par­
ticipation, we, in our scale, address nonparticipation.
Operationalizations of authoritarianism and anomie were derived from Fell­
ing et al. (1987). The selected items cover the nine subsyndromes of au­
thoritarianism as they were conceptualized by Adorno et al. (1982/1950; see 
Appendix 2); respectively, the five elements of anomie as defined by Srole 
(1956), See appendix 3. Scales were constructed via principal-factor analysis 
(PA2 from SPSSx: Nie 1983). Reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) amount to 0.78 
for authoritarianism, and 0.76 for anomie.
Class was operationalized in accordance with the so-called EGP-classifica- 
tion of occupations as designed by Erikson et al. and Portocarero (1983) for 
international comparative research. It was applied to Dutch occupations (as 
coded by the Dutch Bureau for Statistics, C .B.S.) by Ganzeboom et al. (1987). 
This classification contains 10 nominal classes. This nominal level of measure­
ment was accounted for in our analysis (see next section).
Education was measured by asking what educational level was completed by 
the respondents. This classification contains seven interval categories, ranging 
from having completed only primary school to having attained a university degree.
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The operationalization of status-anxiety was also derived from Felling et al. 
(1987). It refers to a subjectively felt uncertainty regarding both one’s future 
economic position as well as one’s future social prestige. The items with which 
this concept was measured were converted into a scale by probabilistic scal- 
ogramanalysis (see Appendix 4). Its reliability (rho) is 0.76. Its scalability (H) 
amounts to 0.39.
The operationalization of socioeconomic frustration also stems from Felling 
et al. (1987). It was measured with two items that referred to the actual financial 
circumstances, and possible dissatisfaction with these (see Appendix 4). Al­
though the reliability of this scale is rather low (Cronbach’s alpha is 0.51), we 
decided to use it because we do not have other data at our disposal.
The operationalization of political radicalism was derived from Barnes and 
Kaase (1979). It consists of items on the topic of participation in unconventional 
political activities like signature-actions, demonstrations, boycotts, unofficial 
strikes, obstruction of roads, damaging property, occupation of buildings, and 
the use of personal violence. The items were converted into a scale via proba­
bilistic scalogramanalysis. This scale is substantially equivalent to that of Barnes 
et al. (1979). The reliability (rho) of the scale is 0.81 and its scalability (H) is
0.54.
Postmaterialism was measured by means of the items and procedure de­
scribed in Inglehart (1977, 1979). Postmaterialistic items refer to the striving for 
a society in which ideas are more important than money, that is less impersonal, 
in which people have a say in the decisions of the government, in which the 
freedom of speech is protected, and in which cities are beautified. Six items 
referring to materialistic goals were also included in the questionnaire. Respon­
dents were asked to select from these 12 items the 5 that they considered to be 
most important. The eventual score of the respondents on postmaterialism equals 
the number of selected postmaterialistic items, ranging from 0 up to 5.
Political distrust was measured by items that were originally formulated by 
Heunks (1983) to measure political trust. The items refer to a lack of trust in, and 
dissatisfaction with, the established political structures and government. We 
constructed the scale by means of principal-factor analysis. Its reliability (Cron­
bach’s alpha) is 0.74.
DATA ANALYSIS
We performed path-analysis by means of regression equations (ordinary 
least squares solution) in order to test the effects predicted in our conceptual 
models (see Figs. 1 and 2). To decide whether effects were substantive, we used 
the criterion of statistical significance. If a t value exceeded 1.96 in absolute 
value {p =  0.05; N  >  12 0 ; two-tailed test) we considered the relation to be 
significant.
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We will first consider the integrated model, represented in the bottom part of 
Fig. 1. Relations of the other models on political apathy [materialistic and 
Frankfurt model, as well as elaborations on it of Felling et al. (1987) and 
Gabennesch (1972); see Political Apathy] are included in it. So our analysis 
actually addresses simultaneously the relations of all described explanatory mod­
els on political apathy. It does even more, since it also tests possible direct 
relations between the exogenous and the other variables that were supposed to be 
absent in the three original models (e.g., the direct relation between social class 
and anomie).
The following equations represent all relevant relations. The regression 
coefficients (bL :) represent the strength of the direct effects of independent on 
dependent variables, that is, the effects controlled for other independent variables 
in the respective equations.
X5 =  a +  b5 ,X1 +  b5 2X2 4- b5 3X3 + b5 4X4 + e5 
X6 =  a + b6 ,X1 + b6 3X2 +  b6 3X3 + b6 4X4 + e6 
X7 = a + b7 | X 1 + b7 ->X2 + b7 3X3 + b7 4X4 + b7 ^X5 + b7 6X6 + e7,
where:
a =  constant
XI =  class
X2 =  status-anxiety
X3 =  socioeconomic frustration
X4 = education
X5 =  authoritarianism
X6 =  anomie
X7 = political apathy
e, =  residual (i =  5,6,7)
Next, we will test the interactive model on political radicalism (see Radical 
Political Behavior). The following equation represents this interactive model (see 
Friedrich, 1982, for more details about this kind of interactive modeling).
X10 =  a + b 10 8X 8 + b 10 9X9 + b 10 8*9X8'::X9 +  e ,0 
where:
a =  constant
X 8 =  political distrust 
X9 = post-materialism
X8:}:X9 =  multiplicative term for the interaction between political distrust and
post-materialism
X 10  =  radicalism 
e I() =  residual
The multiplicative term represents statistically the interaction between political
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distrust and post-materialism. This can be shown by rewriting the equation above 
as follows (see Friedrich, 1982):
X10 =  a + b ]0 8 X8 + (b ,0 9 +  b ,0 8*9X8)X9 +  e ,0
One can see in the right section of this rewritten equation that the effect of X9 on 
X10, as expressed in (b 10 9 +  b 10 8*9X 8 ), varies with the value of X8 . It thus 
represents the interactive model, focussing on political radicalism, we specified 
above. This model predicts that the effect of postmaterialism (X9) on political 
radicalism (X10) varies, depending on the degree of political distrust (X8). [In 
some respects, these two interactive equations may not seem wholly adequate in 
representing the diagram in Figure 2 (e.g., in representing the direct effect of X8 
on X10). However, one should keep in mind that the diagram is just a schematic 
and the equations are algebraic representations of an interactive process: in this 
case, the joint effect of two variables on a third. For those who want more infor­
mation about this way of statistical modeling, we refer to the outstanding article 
by Friedrich (1982). J
If the regression coefficient of the multiplicative term (b l()8*9) is signifi­
cant, according to the criteria specified above, we will decide that there is 
substantive interaction between political distrust and post-materialism regarding 
their effects on political radicalism. [Friedrich (1982), who has contributed a 
great deal to the interpretation of interactive terms in regression analysis, states 
that it is worthwhile to assess the presence of interaction between variables even 
if the unstandardized coefficient of the interactive term is not significant.]
RESULTS
Political Apathy
The regression coefficients of the equations of the apathy model (see pre­
ceding section) are presented in Table I. The first column contains the symbols of 
the independent variables. Because class is considered to be of nominal measure­
ment level, it is broken down into dummy variables which are also listed in this 
first column. The next three columns contain unstandardized regression coeffi­
cients (the equations concerned are indicated by the symbol of the dependent 
variable at the top of each column). These coefficients (b ’s) are expressions of the 
estimated magnitude of the direct effects of the independent variables on the 
dependent ones, controlling for the other independent variables in the respective 
equations. The coefficients of the dummy variables represent how much the 
predicted mean of the concerned category (class) deviates from the predicted 
mean of the reference category. We chose class I (higher-grade professionals, 
administrators and officials; managers in large industrial establishments; large 
proprietors) as the reference category in our analysis.
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Table I. Unstandardized Regression Coefficients of the Apathy Model (N =  1464)
Dependent variables
Independent variables X5 X6 X7
X2 3.00 10.45* - 0 .5 6 *
X3 6 . 1 2* 9.71* -0 .4 1
X4 -  17.78* - 1 3 .3 6 - 1 .1 7 *
X5 0 .0 1 *
X6 0.04*
DI - 1 5 .7 7 -0 .6 1 2.80
D2 - 1 2 .0 4 9.80 6.71*
D3 73.17* 16.02 - 2 . 2 4
D4 6.40 6.52 2.30
D5 30.57 2.86 - 3 . 9 0
D6 35.09* 11.18 1.61
D7 - 1 3 .5 2 18.12 6.82*
D8 14.67 45.33* 7.48*
D9 -1 6 .7 1 - 2 . 9 6 2.59
where:
X3 = status-anxiety
X3 =  socioeconomic frustration
X4 =  education
X5 =  authoritarianism
X6 =  anomie
X7 =  political apathy
and where Dl to D9 are dummy variables for the categories of the nominal variable “ social class” : 
D1 =  lower-grade professionals, managers in small-business and industrial establishments, 
supervisors of non-manual employees, higher-gradc technicians 
D2 =  routine white-collar employees, other rank-and-file service workers 
D3 =  small proprietors with employees 
D4 =  small proprietors without employees 
D5 =  farmers and smallholders, self-employed fishermen 
D6 =  lower-grade technicians, supervisors o f  manual workers 
D7 =  skilled manual workers 
D8 =  semi- and unskilled manual workers 
D9 =  agricultural workers
* =  p <  0 .05, N > 120, two-tailed test.
In Table II we present the standardized regression coefficients of the apathy 
model. The first column contains the independent variables. The next three 
columns contain the standardized regression coefficients of independent vari­
ables that affect the concerned dependent variable. These standardized coeffi­
cients can be interpreted as the influence within the research population of an 
independent variable relative to the influence of the other independent variables 
included in the model. We paid special attention to the computation of the 
standardized coefficient that represents the relative joint effect of the dummy- 
variables, into which social class was broken down, on the dependent variables.
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Table II. Standardized Regression Coefficients of  the
Apathy Model (/V =  1464)
Dependent variables
Independent variables X5 X6 X7
XI 0.18* 0.17* 0.18*
X2 0.05 0.17* - 0 .0 6 *
X3 0 . 1 1 * 0.17* - 0 .0 4
X4 - 0 .3 1 * - 0 .2 3 * - 0 . 1 2*
X5 0.06*
X6 0.25*
R- 0.19 0.24 0.17
where:
XI =  class
X2 =  status-anxiety
X3 =  socioeconomic frustration
X4 =  education
X5 = authoritarianism
X6 =  anomie
X7 =  political apathy
* =  p <  0.05, N > 120. two-tailed test.
[After dummyfication of the original variable, each regression equation contains 
as many singular variables as the number of categories of the original variable 
minus one that serves as a reference category. First, the unstandardized regres­
sion coefficients for separate dummy-variables are estimated. Second, these co­
efficients are linearly combined into a new variable: A = b,dummy, + 
b2dummy2 + . . . bkdummyk. This new variable (A) substitutes the dummy- 
variables exactly and is inserted in a new regression equation. After estimation of 
this equation, an unstandardized coefficient results which by definition takes on a 
value of ‘+  1 After standardization of this coefficient, a regression coefficient 
results that indicates the relative direct effect of the joint dummy-variables into 
which the original variable was broken down. The sign of this coefficient has no 
meaning at all. Estimates of other variables in the equation remain identical 
before and after this procedure, as is the amount of explained variance. The 
adjusted explained variance increases somewhat after this procedure because one 
variable has taken over the role of a number of (dummy-) variables. This pro­
cedure is analogous to the one proposed by Jagodzinski and Weede (1981) for 
regression equations containing exponentials of original variables. A more exten­
sive methodological description of this procedure is contained in an article by 
Eisinga et al. (1990). The last row contains the proportion of explained variance 
(R2) of respective equations. [The explained variances of the respective depen­
dent variables range from about 17 to about 24% (see Tables II and IV). These 
percentages may be classified as modest to fairly good when we relate them to
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percentages found in other similar research in the Netherlands. For instance, 
Elsinga (1985) only reached 5 to 16% in his multivariate models on various types 
of political behavior. As a matter of fact, we did not intend to give an encompass­
ing explanation of the dependent variables. We simply wished to analyze the 
relevance of intrapsychic states for political apathy (status-anxiety, so­
cioeconomic frustration, authoritarianism, anomie) that result from being a 
member of a deprived class in the eighties. The percentages of explained vari­
ance appeared to be large enough to reach substantive conclusions, as will 
become apparent in the remainder of this article.)
Next, we eliminated the nonsignificant predictors from the apathy model 
and estimated the coefficients of this restricted model. The unstandardized re­
gression coefficients of this model are presented in Table III.
Standardized coefficients are presented in Table IV. We used the same 
procedure as described in note 3 to estimate the relative joint effect of the 
dummy-variables of class in this model.
Figure 3 is a graphic representation of these results. Confronting these 
results with the expectations formulated in the theoretical model in our second 
section, we can conclude that the thesis, put forward by the critics of the “ Ver- 
elendungs,, thesis— that belonging to a deprived class has a direct effect on 
political apathy (enhances political apathy)— is corroborated by the results, at 
least as far as these concern the Netherlands during the eighties (see Table III: 
unstandardized regression coefficients of the dummy-variables of social class as 
related to apathy). Deprived classes during the recent period of economic stagna­
tion were the classes with less say in matters concerning labor and means of 
production (manual workers and routine non-manual workers). Member of these 
classes were significantly more apathetic than members of the reference category 
(higher-grade professionals, administrators, and officials; managers in large in­
dustrial establishments; large proprietors). The same holds to a lesser extent for 
lower-grade professionals, small proprietors without employees and lower-grade 
technicians, but these differences are not significant. Self-employed people with 
employees and farmers were less apathetic than our reference category. Notewor­
thy is that the direct joint impact of class on political apathy is significant and 
relatively strong (table IV: b7 , =  .18). In Fig. 1 we utilized the sign in 
connection with the effect of the nominal variable social class on political apathy, 
authoritarianism, and anomie respectively, in order to indicate that what are 
generally considered to be the lower classes (e.g., semi- and unskilled manual 
workers) were expected to have higher scores on political apathy, au­
thoritarianism and anomie in the eighties than the classes generally considered 
higher. However, the Beta-estimates in Tables III and IV, and in Figure 3 do not 
show this negative sign in connection with the effects of social class on the
W  im m ?
respective dependent variables, since, as may have become clear as discussed 
earlier, a sign in these cases has no meaning at all.
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Table III. Unstandardized Regression Coefficients of the Restricted Apathy Model (N = 1464)
Dependent variables
Independent variables X5 X6
X2 10.45*
X3 6.95* 9.71*
X4 -1 8 .0 3 * -1 3 .3 6 *
X5
X6
D 1 - 1 5 .0 8 - .6 1
D2 - 1 1 . 21 9.80
D3 74.48* 16.02
D4 8.20 6.53
D5 30.79 2.87
D6 35.93* 11.19
D7 -1 2 .9 1 18.12
D8 16.13 45.33*
D9 - 1 5 .8 4 - 2 .9 6
X7
— 0 .68*
-1.17*
0.01*
0.04*
2.71
6 .68*
- 2.10
2.19
- 3 . 8 0
1.42
6.54*
7.39*
2.56
where:
X2 =  status-anxiety
X3 =  socioeconomic frustration
X4 =  education
X5 = authoritarianism
X6 =  anomic
X7 =  political apathy
D1 =
D2 = 
D3 =  
D4 = 
D5 = 
D6 = 
D7 =  
D8 =  
D9 =
lower-grade professionals, managers in small-business and industrial establishments, super­
visors of non-manual employees, higher grade technicians 
routine white-collar employees, other rank-and-file service workers 
small proprietors with employees 
small proprietors without employees 
farmers and smallholders, self-employed fishermen 
lower-grade technicians, supervisors of manual workers 
skilled manual workers 
semi- and unskilled manual workers 
agricultural workers
* =  p <  0.05, N  >  120, two-tailed test.
From the Frankfurt School theory, we derived the thesis that belonging to a 
deprived class predisposes one to an authoritarian personality that, in turn, brings 
about retreat from conventional politics, i.e., political apathy. Regarding the first 
part of this thesis (see the unstandardized coefficients of the dummy-variables of 
class as related to authoritarianism in Table III), it appears that lower-grade 
technicians are significantly more authoritarian than our reference category. 
However, this does not apply to the categories that perform manual labor. In­
stead, self-employed people with employees surpassed all other classes concern­
ing authoritarianism. This means that the first part of the Frankfurt thesis, as 
applied to social classes in the Netherlands during the recent economic crisis, is
Political Behavior in the Netherlands 1985 55
Table IV. Standardized Regression Coefficients of the
Restricted Apathy Model (N =  1464)
Dependent variables
Independent variables X5 X6 X7
XI 0.18* 0.17* 0.18*
X2 0.17* - 0 .0 7 *
X3 0 . 1 2* 0.17*
X4 - 0 .3 1 * - 0 .2 3 * - 0 . 1 2*
X5 0.06*
X6 0.24*
R2 0.19 0.24 0.17
where:
XI =  class
X2 =  status-anxiety
X3 =  socioeconomic frustration
X4 =  education
X5 =  authoritarianism
X6 =  anomic
X7 =  political apathy
* =  p <  0.05, N  >  120, two-tailed test.
falsified by the results of the empirical analysis. The relative joint effect of class 
on authoritarianism is relatively strong (Table IV: b5 , =  0.18).
For the second part of the Frankfurt thesis, we examine in Table IV the 
coefficient that indicates the relationship between authoritarianism and political 
apathy (b7 5). This coefficient is significant and does actually have a positive 
sign, though its magnitude is relatively minor (0.06). We conclude that the 
Frankfurt model is partially refuted by the results of our analyses.
Part of the model of Felling et al., namely, the prediction that there are no
- . 1 2
Fig. 3. Empirical model to explain political apathy (with significant Beta-coefficients)
*direct significant effects of class on authoritarianism, anomie and apathy, is 
refuted: the coefficients concerned in Table IV, indicating the relative impact of 
class on authoritarianism (b5 ,), anomie (b6 ,) and apathy (b7 ,) are significant 
and relatively high. Conversely, their thesis that authoritarianism and anomie are 
brought about by feelings of status-anxiety and socioeconomic frustration, is 
largely corroborated by the results of the empirical analysis. With the exception 
of the coefficient of status-anxiety on authoritarianism (b5 ->), all coefficients of 
relevant effects in Table IV (b5 3, b6 2 and b6 3) are significant and have the 
expected sign. The expectation that authoritarianism and anomie have an impact 
on political apathy is also corroborated, as is indicated by b7 5 and b7 6 in Table 
IV. The estimate of the direct effects of socioeconomic frustration on political 
apathy is nonsignificant (h7 3 in Table IV), which is also in line with the formu­
lated theoretical expectations in our second section. But this does not apply to the 
effect of status-anxiety on political apathy (b7 2 in Table IV). This coefficient 
implies that the more one experiences status-anxiety, the less one is inclined to 
political apathy.
The predictions we deduced from theoretical notions of Gabennesch are 
generally supported by our analysis. Education has a negative effect on au­
thoritarianism and anomie, and, what is more important, it also decreases politi­
cal apathy.
POLITICAL RADICALISM
The estimated unstandardized coefficients of the regression equation on 
political radicalism are as follows:
X10 =  .1492 +  .0017X8 + .0668X9 + .0009X8*X9
where:
a =  constant
X 8 =  political distrust 
X9 =  post-materialism
X8*X9 = multiplicative term for the interaction between political distrust and
post-materialism
X 10  =  political radicalism
The proportion explained variance of this model is 0.21. The coefficient belong­
ing to the multiplicative term is significant according to the criterion specified 
above. This implies that our hypothesis on the interactive impact of post-mate­
rialism and political distrust on political radicalism (see above) is empirically 
corroborated. It can be shown that an interpretation of the coefficients of the 
singular terms (b 10 8 and b I0 9) separate from the coefficient of the product-term.
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Table V. Effects of Postmaterialism on Political 
Radicalism at Various Levels of Political Distrust
(N = 1524)
Effects of 
Postmaterialism on 
Political Radicalism
Levels of
Political Distrust
Very low: 0.31
Low: 0.42
Moderate: 0.53
High: 0.64
Very high: 0.75
makes no sense (Friedrich, 1982, p. 806). The estimates of the coefficients of 
singular and multiplicative terms have to be interpreted jointly. According to 
procedures suggested by Friedrich, and in line with our interactive conceptual 
notions, we computed the effect of post-materialism on political radicalism at 
various levels of political distrust. This was done by means of a specially de­
signed computer program, called “ Interact” (Denters and Van Puijenbroek 
1987). The results are presented in Table V. The first column contains five 
specified levels of political distrust. In the second column are the conditional 
unstandardized regression coefficients that indicate the strength of the effect of 
post-materialism on radicalism at the five specified levels of political distrust.
We ascertain that the effect-parameter of post-materialism on political radi­
calism increases with the degree of political distrust. This empirical result is 
entirely consistent with our expectation.
DISCUSSION
The empirical results indicate that the three causal models we specified 
earlier have their merits and flaws. The analysis of the integrated model shows 
that they broadly complement each other in explaining political apathy among 
lower classes in the 80s. Political apathy is relatively well predicted by anomie 
and authoritarianism, although the direct effect of the former variable is by far 
greater than the effect of the latter. This finding supports the theoretical notions 
put forward by the Frankfurt School and by Felling et al. Both anomie and 
authoritarianism result to some extent from feelings of status-anxiety and so­
cioeconomic frustration. This is in accordance with notions of Felling et al. A 
more salient direct effect on anomie and authoritarianism as well as on political 
apathy stems from social class. Thus, no argument can be found in the results to
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reject, as Felling et al. did, the materialist hypothesis of a direct link between 
social class, on the one hand, and attitudes (authoritarianism, anomie) and politi­
cal behavior (apathy), on the other hand. The results show furthermore that 
education decreases political apathy, authoritarianism, and anomie. This is what 
we expected on the grounds of conceptual notions derived from Gabennesch.
With respect to radical political behavior, the interactive hypothesis we 
formulated in our third section above is corroborated by the results of the analy­
sis. Those who gave higher priority to postmaterialistic values were more prone 
to radical political activities than others. This connection was stronger to the 
extent that they had less confidence in politics.
A general conclusion may be that the economic stagnation and the retrench­
ment measures of the Dutch government had far-reaching consequences for the 
subjective experience of socio-economic, and political life, as well as for the 
political behavior of Dutch citizens. Those who experienced (relative) depriva­
tion were inclined to turn their backs on politics. Those who were better off, but 
became frustrated as a consequence of the delayed fulfillment of post-mate­
rialistic expectations, were inclined to take up radical political means in order to 
influence governmental decision-making.
APPENDIX 1: POLITICAL APATHY ITEMS AND PROBABILISTIC
SCALOGRAMANALYSIS (N =  1732)
The difficulty is the proportion of the sample that agreed with the item. The H(I)-coefficient 
indicates the statistical association of the item with the other items in the scale.
The re sp o n d e n t ............. Difficulty H(I)
1 Never reads about politics. 0. 1 1 0.54
2 Did not vote at the last national election. 0. 1 2 0.38
3 Never discusses politics. 0.13 0.58
4 Never gets in touch with politicians. 0.73 0.49
5 Never tries to solve local problems. 0.75 0.43
6 Never tries to convince friends to vote for his favored party. 0.82 0.35
7 Never visits political meetings. 0.83 0.54
8 Is not a member of a political party. 0.91 0.50
9 Never is active for a political party. 0.93 0.62
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A PPEND IX  2: A U T H O R ITA R IA N ISM  ITEM S AND PE R C EN TA G E S,
AND FA CTO RA N A LY SIS (N =  1520)
Frequencies (%) 
Neutral
Agree Disagree h2 Loadings
1 People can be divided in two distinct 
classes: the weak and the strong. 36.9 19.2 43.9 0.32 0.56
2 Familiarity breeds contempt. 22. 1 26.6 51.3 0.28 0.53
3 Young people sometimes get rebellious 
ideas, but as they grow up, they ought to 
get over them and settle down. 34.5 26.7 38.8 0.38 0.62
4 Most of our social problems would be 
solved if we could somehow get rid of the 
immoral, crooked and feeble-minded 
people. 17.4 17.3 65.3 0.31 0.56
5 What this country needs most, more than 
laws and political programs, is a few 
courageous, fearless, devoted leaders in 
whom the people can put their faith in. 37.0 23.7 39.3 0.38 0.62
6 A person who has bad manners, habits 
and breeding can hardly expect to get 
along with decent people. 42.3 30.0 27.7 0.26 0.51
7 Nowadays more and more people are 
prying into matters that should remain 
personal and private. 46.9 25.3 27.8
8 Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on 
children, deserve more than mere 
imprisonment: such criminals ought to be 
whipped publicly, or worse. 38.4 19.7 41.9 0.30 0.55
9 If people would talk less and work harder, 
everybody would be better oft'. 35.5 27.1 37.4 0.37 0.61
explained variance =  32.5%
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APPENDIX 3: A N O M IE ITEM S, PER C EN TA G ES AND
FACTORANALYSIS
Frequencies (%) 
neutral
Agree Disagree h2 Loadings
1 There is little use in writing to public 
officials because often they aren't really 
interested in the problems of the average 
man. 22.4 26.9 50.7 0.51 0.71
2 Nowadays a person has to live pretty 
much for today and let tomorrow take 
care of itself. 16.8 23.0 60.2 0.39 0.62
3 In spite of what people say, the lot of the 
average man is getting worse, not better. 39.9 28.8 31.3 0.25 0.50
4 It’s hardly fair to bring children into the 
world with the way things look for the 
future. 9.0 21.4 69.6
5 These days a person doesn't really know 
whom he can count on. 29.1 27.9 43.0 0.34 0.58
6 Criticizing the government is useless, 
because the government just sticks to the 
policies it thinks proper. 31.3 22.7 46.0 0.54 0.73
explained variance 40.6%
APPENDIX 4: STATUS-ANXIETY AND S O C IO E C O N O M IC
FR U STR A TIO N
The items below were used to measure status-anxiety (N = 1763). We present the percentage of
the people who agreed with the questions (difficulty) and the association of the item with other items
in the scale (Hi).
_____________________________________________________________________________ Difficulty Hi
1 Arc you ever afraid that your momentary situation will get worse in the 
near future?
2 Do you think that you won't be able to afford yourself as much luxury as 
you have now, in the near future?
3 Do you think you will have to curtail your housekeeping money in the 
near future?
4 Are you ever worried about the possibility that people of lower status 
will come to live in your street?
5 Are you ever worried about the possibility that the status of your 
neighbourhood will decline?
0.53 0.41
0.53 0.41
0.58 0.47
0. 10 0.37
0.20 0.30
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6 Are you ever worried about the possibility that you will have to change
your contemporary lifestyle? 0.36 0.30
The items below were combined to measure socioeconomic frustration (N = 1776). Behind the 
answers are the percentual frequencies of the people who gave the concerned answer. The association 
between both items is 0.24 (Cramer’s V).
Please compare your contemporary situation with the situation of five years ago. In what way has the 
income before taxes of the household you belong to, changed?
(strongly) decreased 38.1
stayed the same 25.8
(strongly) increased 36.1
Arc you satisfied or dissatisfied with your present income?
(very) dissatisfied 17.1
neutral 20.0
(very) satisfied 62.8
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